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THE EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE AND WHY THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
SHOULD REJECT UNITED STATES V. LEON ON INDEPENDENT
STATE GROUNDS
Although the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
says nothing about how it is to be enforced, the exclusionary rule' has
existed in the federal criminal justice system for over seventy-five years
and has been applicable to the states since 1961. Nevertheless, the
exclusionary rule has been a source of much debate since its creation.
The United States Supreme Court limited the effect of the rule in United
States v. Leon2 by announcing that evidence would not be excluded
when the police acted in good faith reliance on a warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate but later found to have been issued
without probable cause.
This comment suggests that by restricting the exclusionary rule the
Supreme Court has lessened the fourth amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that the Louisiana Supreme
Court should reject Leon when construing article I, section 5 of the
Louisiana constitution.3 By examining the language of Louisiana's Dec-
laration of Rights, the intent of the framers of the 1974 constitution,
the prior expansive interpretations by the Louisiana Supreme Court of
article I, section 5, and the experience of other jurisdictions regarding
the good faith exception, this comment will show why the Supreme
Court of Louisiana should reject the good faith exception.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Although the development of the exclusionary rule may be traced
to Boyd v. United States,4 the Supreme Court first applied it in a
Copyright 1991, by LOUiSIANA LAW REVI w.
1. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914), stated for the first
time that, in a federal prosecution, the fourth amendment bars the use of evidence
obtained from an illegal search and seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684,
reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S. Ct. 23 (1961), made the exclusionary rule an essential
part of the fourth amendment and accordingly, applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.
2. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
3. All five Louisiana Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted the Leon good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule with virtually no consideration of art. I, § 5. See infra
note 46. The Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 46-48.
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
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criminal case in Weeks v. United States.' In reversing the conviction of
the defendant, the Court concluded the fourth amendment barred the
use of illegally seized evidence:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and
... might as well be stricken from the Constitution.6
Although the courts of many states followed Weeks, not until Mapp
v. Ohio7 did the Supreme Court declare that the exclusionary rule was
"an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. '"
The Court addressed the question why the exclusionary rule should be
incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and thus be applicable to state court proceedings:
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would
be "a form of words", valueless and undeserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too
without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom
"implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty."' 9
Since the Court's decision in Mapp, however, the exclusionary rule
has come under constant attack, and the scope of its application has
slowly and steadily eroded. Perhaps the most telling illustration of the
narrowing of the exclusionary rule is in the Court's focus over the last
twelve years on the question of standing to assert a fourth amendment
claim.
In Rakas v. Illinois,0 the Court held that in order to raise a fourth
amendment violation (with the consequence of an exclusion of evidence)
5. Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914). In Weeks, the government tried and
convicted the defendant for illegal gambling. He had requested the return of incriminating
letters and records that had been seized by the government during the search of his home.
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344 (1914) (emphasis
added).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
8. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657, 81 S. Ct. at 1693.
9. Id. at 655, 81 S. Ct. at 1691. Following Mapp, the Supreme Court, virtually
without question, assumed that the exclusionary rule applied to evidence obtained in
violation of a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S. Ct. 11
(1966).
10. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S.
1122, 99 S. Ct. 1035 (1979).
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a person must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the thing
searched. In Rawlings v. Kentucky," the Court amplified upon the
doctrine of standing, stating that having a possessory interest, such as
ownership, in the items seized does not necessarily authorize a person
to challenge the constitutionality of their seizure. The Court signaled
that it would recognize arguments only from a person with a legitimate
expectation of privacy with respect to the things seized or place searched. 2
With a force nearly equal to the outcry that met the Court's decision
in Mapp, many have criticized the Court for limiting the application of
the exclusionary rule, with some suggesting that certain members of the
Court have sought to raise standing as a barrier because of their distaste
for the rule. 3 It has not gone without notice that Justice Rehnquist,
the author of both Rakas and Rawlings, has indicated he feels Mapp
should be overruled. 4 Moreover, apart from the Court's gradual com-
pression of the scope of the exclusionary rule, it is now clear that a
majority of the Court believes that the exclusionary rule is not required
by the Constitution." In Leon, the Court simply stated that the rule is
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights (through its deterrent effect); it is not a constitutional right to a
person aggrieved.' 6
11. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
12. Both Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented in Rawlings, stating that the fourth
amendment was designed to protect property interests as well as privacy interests. Rawlings,
448 U.S. at 114-21, 100 S. Ct. at 2566-69. In Rakas, Justice White dissented, with whom
Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall joined, arguing that the Court's prior decisions
had established that people other than those who hold title to the premises have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. A person sharing possession of a premises with others, although
with the understanding that his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is
sharing his privacy only with those persons, and that government officials will not intrude
without consent or within compliance with the fourth amendment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at
161-66, 99 S. Ct. at 440-42.
13. See Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 487, 493 (1988).
14. Id. at 527 n.168.
15. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3411 (1984).
16. Leon, id., 104 S. Ct. at 3412 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974)). Departing from the jurisprudence, the Court in Leon
stated the following: (i) the exclusionary rule is not required by the fourth amendment,
rather, it is a judicially created remedy with the sole function of deterring improper police
conduct; and (ii) the issue for determination is whether to allow the prosecution to use
inherently trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant which
was ultimately found to be defective yet issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.
This should be resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the uses of such
unconstitutional evidence. Id. at 897, 104 S. Ct. at 3405. In dissent, Justices Brennan
and Marshall pointed out that (i) contrary to the claims that the rule leads to "release
of countless guilty criminals" studies indicate that the federal and state prosecutors rarely
'drop cases because of potential search and seizure problems, (ii) because some guilty
19911
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Although the Court's carving of a good faith exception out of the
exclusionary rule may not seem to be overly significant, the Court is
likely to continue to chip away at the doctrine. For instance, in Illinois
v. Krull,7 the Court extended the good faith exception to warrantless
inspections authorized by a state statute later held to be invalid. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented,
stressing the danger of extending the good faith exception to cases where
the legislature has unreasonably authorized searches."
In this regard, Professor LaFave has written:
Under the pre-Leon version of the exclusionary rule, police had
finally come to learn that it was not enough that they had gotten
a piece of paper called a warrant .... Consequently, there had
developed in many localities the very sound practice of going
through the warrant issuing process with the greatest care ...
but under Leon there is no reason to go through such cautious
procedures and every reason not to ... [t]here is thus no
escaping the fact that, as the Leon dissenters put it, the "long
run of that case unquestionably will be to undermine the integrity
of the warrant process."' 9
Additionally, contrary to the basic text of the good faith exception,
it may be argued forcefully that the exclusionary rule is found in the
text of the fourth amendment:
The evil [addressed by the framers] was general; it was the
creation of an administration of public justice that authorized
the supported indiscriminate searching and seizing .... I do not
think that the phraseology of the amendment ... is accidental.
"[T]he right of the people in securing their persons, houses,
papers and effect, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
The vice of a system of criminal justice that relies upon a
professional and admits evidence they obtained by unreasonable
searches and seizures is precisely that we are all thereby made
defendants go free is not a cost of the exclusionary rule but of the fourth amendment
itself, (iii) deterrence was not a concern of the Court in the early cases, and (iv) the
"reasonable mistakes" exception to the exclusionary rule places a premium on police
ignorance of the law, with the long run effect of undermining the integrity of the warrant
process itself. Id. at 928-60, 104 S. Ct. at 3430-45. Justice Stevens, also dissenting, noted
that from a historical standpoint, the precise problem that the fourth amendment was
intended to address was the reasonable issuance of warrants. He stated that the court's
conclusion that such searches undertaken without probable cause can nevertheless "be
reasonable" is totally without support in the jurisprudence. Id. at 970-72, 104 S. Ct. at
3451-52.
17. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
18. Krull, 480 U.S. at 366, 107 S. Ct. at 1175-76.
19. W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 1.2, at 20 (1986).
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less secure in our person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.20
The exclusionary rule promotes constitutional police behavior, not
police ignorance. It promotes careful review by judges or magistrates
who are aware that they may be overruled. It preserves judicial integrity
by not allowing the courts to profit from or to continue to allow
unconstitutional behavior. If not part and parcel of the right, the ex-
clusionary rule at least provides an effective remedy for the violation
of a fundamental right.
Regardless of whether the exclusionary rule is required by the fourth
amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court is not bound to follow Leon's
restrictive interpretation of the right to be protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The state constitution can provide authority for
the existence of the exclusionary rule regardless of the interpretation of
the federal document given by the current Supreme Court.
THE RoLE oF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM AND THE
LOUISIANA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, ARTICLE I, SECTION 5
In the area of civil liberties, many think only of the federal Bill of
Rights. Most of the original state constitutions, however, contained
provisions similar to those of the Bill of Rights. To a certain extent,
the framers patterned the Bill of Rights upon the guarantees of states'
charters. 21
A "rediscovery" of state constitutional protection began in the 1970's
when state courts began deciding cases based on state rather than on
federal constitutional provisions.2 Indeed, the "[riediscovery by state
supreme courts of the broader protection supported their own citizens
by the state constitutions ... is probably the most important devel-
opment in constitutional jurisprudence of our times." '23 More and more
state courts are construing state constitutional provisions to grant persons
20. A. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 302 at 367 (emphasis
added).
21. R. Williams, State Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, 68 (1988).
22. Id.
23. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 489 (1977). Associate Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has also
written of the rebirth of interest in state constitutional law:
Lately, of course, it is the state courts that have been expressing dissatisfaction
with the Supreme Court's role in the enforcement of constitutional rights,
increasingly turning to their own constitutions as the dispositive ground for their
decisions, and the Supreme Court since at least 1983 has been issuing a clear
invitation for them to do exactly that.
Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1 Emerging
Issues St. Const. L. 17, 20-21 (1988).
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
greater protections than the federal courts have gleaned from the Bill
of Rights, even when the state and federal provisions are worded iden-
tically.24
Louisiana adopted a new constitution in 1974. It begins with the
Declaration of Rights, the state counterpart to the Bill of Rights. Al-
though the Declaration of Rights was perceived by many delegates to
the Louisiana Constitutional Convention as a radical document making
extreme innovations, the changes seem less significant when compared
with the existing United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Bill
of Rights. 2 The Louisiana constitution of 1974 afforded the Louisiana
Supreme Court a means of expanding constitutional rights and civil
liberties through its interpretation of the Declaration of Rights.26 The
Louisiana Supreme Court has made it clear that the Louisiana consti-
tution offers wider protections than the Bill of Rights.27 Literally, article
I, section 5 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights is broader than its
federal counterpart. Section 5 provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, commu-
nications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for
the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to
raise its illegality in the appropriate court.2 s
Among other reasons, the language is more inclusive than the fourth
amendment because of the additional protection for property and com-
munications against unreasonable invasions of privacy.
24. Nat'l L.J., special section at S-i (Sept. 29, 1986).
25. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. (1974).
26. For a very good analysis of the court's expansion of civil liberties vis-a-vis judicial
interpretation of the Declaration of Rights, see Comment, The Declaration of Rights of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,
51 La. L. Rev. 787 (1991). The author explains that (i) the court interprets additional
language than the state absent from the federal Constitution as granting additional rights,
(ii) the court interprets language which is similar or identical under the federal provisions
in an expanded manner, and (iii) the court sometimes expands rights by freezing the high
water mark under federal jurisprudence.
27. See Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985)
(equal protection, art. 1, § 3); State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979) (cruel,
excessive, unusual punishment, art. 1, § 20); State in re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 722 (1978) (due process, art. 1, § 2) (rights of accused,
art. 1, § 13); State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166 (La. 1977) (right to keep and bear arms,
art. 1, § 11).
28. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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Though the exclusionary rule is not explicitly stated in article I,
section 5, the drafters considered it implicit. 29 The expanded standing
provision found in the last sentence of section 5 grants standing to any
person "adversely affected." This is a recognition of the broadening of
the right to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the constitution
regardless of the federal jurisprudence.30 The phrase "any person ad-
versely affected" has been explained to mean "anyone whose guilt [the.
improperly obtained evidence] would tend to prove .... The scope of
the exclusionary rule is thus enlarged . . .
Transcripts of the debate of article I, section 5 do not shed great
light on the intent of the framers, but it is at least clear that the framers
contemplated the exclusionary rule, as well as Mapp.
Mr. Burson ... it is my understanding by the present state of
the law that the protection of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which gives the criminal
defendant the right to suppress evidence that is illegally seized
from him, has been applied through the Mapp decision to all
states today ... so, both the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure and the Federal Constitution require, today, that a person
who has been the subject of an illegal search and seizure in his
home can have that evidence suppressed in a criminal proceeding
... and to his right criminally, there is no question that under
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp and under
the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, that the person
whose home has been entered illegally, certainly can move to
suppress that evidence in court.3 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court has plainly stated that article I, section
5 is not a duplicate of the fourth amendment: "[ilt represents a conscious
choice by the citizens of Louisiana to give a 'higher standard of individual
liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal
Constitution."' 33 The following cases illustrate the court's contemporary
interpretations.
29. Hargrave, supra note 25, at 22, citing State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention
of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts, Sept. 1, 1973, at 22 [hereinafter Proceedings].
30. Hargrave, supra note 25, at 22, citing Proceedings, Sept. 1, at 15.
31. Id. at 23-24, citing Proceedings, Sept. 1, at 15, 22.
32. Proceedings, Aug. 31, at 1073. However, Staff Memorandum No. 37 to the
Committee on the Bill of Rights and Elections, May 16, 1973, makes it clear that art.
I, § 5 does not bolt down any present interpretation or methods of application (including
Mapp v. Ohio). Documents Vol. 10 at 117.
33. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 996 (La. 1989) (citing State v. Hernandez, 410
So. 2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982)).
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In State v. Hernandez,3 4 the court rejected the United States Supreme
Court holding of New York v. Belton," that a policeman, while making
a lawful arrest, may contemporaneously search the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile including the contents of any container therein.
Justice Dennis, writing for the Court in Hernandez, stated that "[a]lthough
the Belton case is distinguishable ... it should be noted that we do
not consider it to be a correct rule of police conduct under our state
constitution." ' 36 Moreover, the court noted that it would not allow federal
decisions to replace its independent judgment in construing the consti-
tution adopted by the people of Louisiana.17 Similarly, in State v.
Church" the court said that even if DWI road blocks meet federal
constitutional standards,3 9 they would still violate article I, section 5 of
the Louisiana constitution. Not all of the Justices of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, however, advocate the expansive reading of article I,
section 5. Justice Cole, dissenting in Church, wrote:
As regards the question of whether the Louisiana Constitution
is broader than the United States Constitution relative to Fourth
Amendment principles, I concur in the conclusion of Justice
Blanche in his dissent to State v. Hernandez: "However, if the
Louisiana [constitution] is, in fact, broader than the United
States Constitution on that issue, this writer feels that the [Louis-
iana] Constitution is due for an amendatory change in the
opposite direction.'"'4
In State v. Williams,41 the court refused to extend the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Pennsylvania v. Mimms42-that a police of-
ficer's direction to a driver to exit the car did not violate the fourth
amendment, even though the officer had no probable cause nor reason
to suspect foul play-to a passenger of an automobile. The court stated:
To give the police officer the discretion to order the passenger
from the automobile without requiring any explanation of the
officer's actions (other than a blanket concern for personal safety
34. State v. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
35. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 950,
102 S. Ct. 26 (1981).
36. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d at 1385.
37. Id.
38. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
39. Id. at 996 (referring to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979)).
40. Id. at 1001 (citation omitted). For other cases, holding that art. I, § 5 is broader
than the fourth amendment, see State v. Hutchinson, 349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977) and
State v. Kinnemann, 337 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976). Both cases involved searches of automobiles
involving contraband.
41. State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978).
42. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977).
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in all situations) is to abandon the requirement of individualized
inquiry into the reasons for an intrusion of the right to privacy
secured by Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. 43
In State v. Nelson," with Justice Tate writing for the majority, the
court held that article I, section 5 prevented admittance of an inculpatory
statement police obtained as a result of the use by private actors of
unreasonable force in an unreasonable search.45 The defendant in Nelson
swallowed a ring in a jewelry store and the store's security guards
attempted to choke it out of the defendant.
In the six years since Leon, every circuit court in Louisiana has
adopted the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.4 In the same
period of time, the Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule in one case and then only in
dicta. In State v. Matthieu,47 the supreme court determined that a
constitutional violation had not occurred when a search took place
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court which issued the
warrant. Nevertheless, with Justice Cole authoring the opinion, the court
delved into an unusual analysis of Leon, borrowing "the balancing test"
to apply to "constitutional conduct.' '48 Justice Dennis, in a concurring
opinion, reasoned that because there had been no constitutional violation,
there was no need for discussion of the so-called good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule and that Leon was not applicable. 49
43. Williams. 366 So. 2d at 1374.
44. State v. Nelson, 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
45. See also State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979) (recognizing that the
exclusionary rule extends to some unreasonable searches by private individuals).
46. State v. Shannon, 472 So. 2d 286 (La. App. 1st Cir.) writ denied, 476 So. 2d
349 (La. 1985); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); State v. Martin,
487 So. 2d 1295 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 491 So. 2d 25 (La. 1986); State v.
Watkins, 499 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); State v. Shrader, 514 So. 2d 213 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1987). None of the courts give any detailed analysis for their decision to
adopt Leon.
47. State v. Matthieu, 506 So. 2d 1209 (La. 1987).
48. The Matthieu court said:
The Supreme Court in Leon required objective reasonableness to avoid sup-
pression where the Fourth Amendment had been violated. No such violation
occurred in the case under consideration. Consequently, we believe a less stringent
standard is appropriate where we are not concerned with deterring unconsti-
tutional conduct. Our law, both statutorily and jurisprudentially, stresses the
importance of constitutional violations in cases involving the exclusionary rule.
Code Crim. P. art. 703(A) provides a defendant adversely affected may move
to suppress any evidence from use at trial on the ground it was unconstitutionally
obtained.
Id. at 1212.
49. Id. at 1214. See also State v. Byrd, 568 So. 2d 554 (La. 1990). It is interesting
that in State v. Lehnen, 403 So. 2d 683 (La. 1981), the court discussed the good faith
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Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court rendered two decisions that
further expand the rights granted in article I, section 5 in non-criminal
matters. In Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher,50 the court held for the first
time that the state's right of privacy includes and independently protects
at least some sort of "autonomy" rights.' Additionally, in Moresi v.
State of Louisiana, Department of Wildlife & Fisheries,52 the court
indicated that the protections of article I, section 5 extend beyond limiting
state action and apply directly to limit invasions of privacy interests by
private parties. The court also ruled for the first time that a violation
of article I, section 5 may give rise to a private cause of action for
damages. 53
THE LEAD FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
United States v. Leon has been strongly criticized by several state
courts.54 For example, State v. Novembrino," a recent New Jersey Su-
preme Court decision, rejected Leon on independent state grounds. The
court held that the exclusionary rule, unmodified by the good faith
exception, is an integral element of the New Jersey constitutional guar-
antee that search warrants will not be issued without probable cause.
It accepted the analysis Justice Brennan set forth in his Leon dissent,
stating that "by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary be-
comes a part of what is in fact a single government action prohibited
exception to the exclusionary rule which had been proposed by half of the judges of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States. Justices Dennis and Calogero rejected
the majority's discussion or endorsement of the good faith exception, and stated that it
was unnecessary. Justice Dennis, quoting United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 849-
50 (1980) (Rubin, J., concurring), wrote that "[d]eterrence is an important reason for
the rule. However, even the decision in Weeks v. United States did not consider it the
only basis of the rule." Id. at 688 (citation omitted).
50. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
51. See Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 297-306 (1990).
52. 567 So. 2d 1081 (1990).
53. Id. Although Moresi involved a search and seizure, the court held that no
constitutional rights were violated. Nonetheless, the court recognized that the same facts
which compelled the United States Supreme Court to recognize a qualified good faith
immunity for state officers in the context of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, required
it to identify a similar immunity for an action arising from the state constitution. Justice
Dennis made it clear in Moresi that this was not a criminal case where a defendant was
trying to suppress evidence; therefore, even if constitutional rights were involved, the
officers could invoke a qualified good faith immunity as a defense.
54. See N. McCabe & C. Burnett, State Constitutional Procedure: Cases and Materials
37 (2d ed. 1990).
55. 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987). For a more recent decision rejecting the good faith
exception on independent state grounds, see Commonwealth v. Edmonds, 586 A.2d 887
(Pa. 1991).
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by the terms of the Amendment." 5 6 The court reasoned that the exclu-
sionary rule's purpose is not solely "deterrence" and that application
of the rule in individual cases should not depend on an empirical analysis
which compares the "cost" and "benefits" of excluding illegally obtained
evidence."7 It quoted Justice Brennan:
I share the view, expressed by Justice Stewart for the Court in
Faretta v. California, that "[p]ersonal liberties are not based on
the law of averages." Rather than seeking to give effect to the
liberties secured by the Fourth Amendment through guesswork
about deterrence, the Court should restore to its proper place
the principle framed 70 years ago in Weeks that an individual
whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the Fourth
Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to prevent
the government from subsequently making use of any evidence
so obtained."
The court noted that the exclusionary rule, by virtue of its application
over the last quarter of a century had become an integral part of the
New Jersey constitutional guarantee that search warrants should not be
issued without probable cause. Not only does the exclusionary rule deter
police misconduct, said the court, but it also serves as an indispensable
and valuable mechanism for vindicating the right to be free from un-
reasonable searches. 59
In State v. Marsala,6° the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the
good faith exception of Leon on state constitutional grounds. The search
and seizure provision of the Connecticut constitution is textually identical
to the fourth amendment. The court nevertheless rejected the exception.
Some of the reasons include: the "costs" of the exclusionary rule do
not outweigh the rule's "benefits"; the rule requires judges to take their
roles seriously; the state due process clause compels the rule; other
common law or statutory privileges exclude relevant evidence; the purpose
of the privacy clause is to prohibit warrants without probable cause;
exclusion is not a punishment but a method of teaching proper con-
stitutional behavior that preserves the integrity of the warrant process. 6'
The court also stated that a good faith exception promotes police to
seek out a lenient judge, allows magistrates to be careless with their
56. Id. at 848 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
3432 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 943, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3438
(1984) (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
59. Id. at 856.
60. 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990).
61. Id.
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reviewing, and takes the constitutional question away by allowing eve-
rything to turn on good faith. 62
CONCLUSION
Three years before the United States Supreme Court decided Leon,
former Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Dixon stated the following
in State v. Bickham:6 3
[I]t seems to me to be especially unfortunate for this court to
indicate, when it is not an issue in the case . .. that the "good
faith" of an officer is relevant to determine the legality of his
actions. It is what the officer does or does not do, and not
what he knows or how he feels about it, that is relevant. I
dread to think of the day that motions to suppress in criminal
trials will be further prolonged by litigating whether some hard-
working policeman, trying to do his job, was in "good faith"
or "bad faith" when he arrested the defendant."
Unfortunately, it appears that Chief Justice Dixon was an accurate
prognosticator. Leon is unduly restrictive of the fourth amendment
protections. The Louisiana Supreme Court has the authority to reject
the good faith exception of Leon on the grounds of article I, section
5 of the Louisiana constitution. Even Justice Frankfurter, one of the
most conservative members of the United States Supreme Court, once
noted, "[ilt is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of
liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very
nice people." '65
If the Louisiana Constitution does not compel the exclusionary rule,
it is certainly still within the Louisiana Supreme Court's authority to
insist upon the exclusionary rule to enforce our constitutional guarantees.
It is the duty of the courts to safeguard the constitutional rights of its
citizens against "any stealthy encroachments thereon. "66 Recently, several
states, acting progressively, have adopted the exclusionary rule under
the authority of state constitutional clauses that are textually identical
to the federal document. Article I, section 5, through its expanded
62. Id. at 67. For other states rejecting Leon see People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451
(N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d
308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
63. 404 So. 2d 929 (La. 1981).
64. Id. at 935 (Dixon, C.J., concurring).
65. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69, 70 S. Ct. 430, -(1950) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
66. State v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993, 997 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 653, 6 S. Ct. 524, 535 (1886)).
[Vol. 51
19911 COMMENTS 873
standing and broader protections, should compel or at least imply the
existence and preservation of the exclusionary rule.
As Justice Clark stated in reference to Mapp, it is "[n]o use to
have a Constitution-it's pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it,
but it doesn't mean anything, just a piece of paper-unless you really
live by it and enforce it. '167
Jean-Paul Layrisson
67. Baier, Justice Clark, the Voice of the Past, and the Exclusionary Rule, 64 Tex.
L. Rev. 415, 419 (1985).

